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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Should Plaintiffs' brief be dismissed due to their 
failure to cite the trial court record as required by Rule 24, 
URAP? Where an appellant fails to make a concise statement of the 
facts and citation of the pages in the record where those facts are 
supported the court will assume the correctness of the judgment 
below. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California. 746 P.2d 1182, 
1184 (Utah App. 1987). 
2. Can a challenge to the constitutionality of a Utah 
statute be raised for the first time on appeal? The general rule 
in Utah is that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be 
raised on appeal. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996) . 
3. Can a challenge be made to the apportionment of fault on 
a special verdict form when the jury finds no fault; particularly 
in light of case precedent on the issue noting that no challenge 
can be made under such circumstances? A challenge to the inclusion 
of a nonparty on the special verdict form will not be addressed on 
appeal where the jury finds no negligence and never reaches the 
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question of apportionment. Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1026 
(Utah 1994). 
4. Can Plaintiffs challenge the special verdict form without 
evidence in the record that the issue was preserved before the 
trial court? In the absence of a complete record, it is assumed 
that the proceedings in the trial court were regular and proper. 
Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1024-1025 (Utah 1994). 
5. Is Section 78-27-38, U.C.A., constitutional? Based on 
the holdings referenced in Issues 1, 2,3 and 4 above, Koulis v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 
1987), State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996) and Turner 
v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1024-1025 (Utah 1994), this issue should 
not be addressed on the merits. 
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when, pursuant 
to Rule 4 03, URE, as set forth in Defendant's Motion in Limine 
prior to trial, it excluded evidence offered by Plaintiffs 
regarding the revocation of Defendant's dental license about one 
year after Defendant last treated Plaintiffs' decedent and regard-
ing alleged observations by a dental assistant subsequent to 
treatment of the decedent. A trial court's ruling regarding the 
admissibility of evidence under Rule 4 03 will not be overturned 
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unless it was an abuse of discretion. State v. White, 880 P.2d 18 
(Utah App. 1994) . Appraisal of the probative and prejudicial value 
of evidence under Rule 4 03 is generally entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge and will not be upset on appeal 
absent manifest error. State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 
1991) . 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-27-38, 78-27-39 and 78-27-40; Rules 
403 and 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (Attached as Addendum "A"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a jury verdict in a dental malpractice 
action in favor of the Defendant. (R. at 692-693). Plaintiffs7 
claims were in the form of a wrongful death action alleging that 
Defendant's dental treatment was negligent and caused bacterial 
endocarditis which caused the death of Plaintiffs' Decedent 
("Decedent"). Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine 
seeking to exclude all evidence regarding the revocation of 
Defendant's dental license, which occurred about one year after 
Defendant last treated the Decedent, and to exclude all evidence 
regarding alleged observations by a former dental assistant 
subsequent to treatment of the decedent. (R. at 339-347, 675). The 
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court granted Defendant's Motion. (R. at 675) . The court, however, 
did allow the jury to hear evidence of Defendant's criminal 
convictions for fraud. 
Following a seven-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict 
of no cause of action in favor of defendant. (R. at 614-617, 692-
693). The jury found, pursuant to the Special Verdict Form, that 
Defendant was not negligent. (R. at 614-617). Since the jury 
found no negligence on the part of the Defendant, it was not 
required to answer the remaining questions on the Special Verdict 
form. Following the verdict, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New 
Trial, alleging that the granting of Defendant's Motion in Limine 
was in error. (R. at 644). Plaintiffs' Motion was denied. (R. at 
682-690). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs' decedent, Randy Wilson, suffered from 
congenital heart disease. In 1959 he underwent surgery for aortic 
coarctation (malformation or deformity of the aorta). In 1986 he 
underwent surgery for an aortic aneurysm and had his aortic valve 
replaced with a pericardial tissue valve. (R. at 346). 
2. Defendant, Dr. Day, provided dental treatment to 
Mr. Wilson on several occasions from December 1986 through April 
1991. (R. at 346). 
3. In October 1989 Mr. Wilson was diagnosed with bacterial 
endocarditis (infection of the pericardial valve). (R. at 346, 
356) . 
4. In March 1992, Mr. Wilson was again diagnosed with 
bacterial endocarditis. (R. at 346). 
5. In May 1992, Mr. Wilson was diagnosed a third time with 
bacterial endocarditis. (R. at 346, 356). 
6. In July 1993, Mr. Wilson underwent surgery for 
replacement of his aortic valve. (R. at 346, 356). 
7. Following his surgery in July 1993, Mr. Wilson 
experienced a seizure, followed by cardiac arrest, probable 
aspiration pneumonia and finally death on July 19, 1993. (R. at 
286-288, 346, 356). 
8. Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against 
Defendant alleging that Defendant's dental treatment was negligent 
and caused bacterial endocarditis which caused the death of the 
decedent. (R. at 675). 
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9. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine 
seeking to exclude all evidence offered by Plaintiffs regarding the 
revocation of Defendant's dental license, which occurred about one 
year after Defendant last treated Mr. Wilson, and to exclude all 
evidence regarding alleged observations by a dental assistant 
subsequent to treatment of Plaintiffs' decedent. (R. at 339-347, 
675) . 
10. The trial court granted defendant's Motion in Limine, 
ordering that Plaintiffs be precluded from introducing the afore-
mentioned evidence. (R. at 675). . c 
11. Following a seven-day jury trial, the matter was 
submitted to the jury by way of a Special Verdict Form. (R. at 
613-617). 
• 12... Included on the special verdict form was a question 
regarding the potential fault of Dr. Dennis Dobson, a non-party 
dentist who had provided treatment to the decedent. (R. at 616). 
13. On June 25, 1996, a verdict was returned by the jury in 
favor of the Defendant. (R. at 613-617) 
14. The Special Verdict Form signed by the foreperson 
establishes that the only question answered by the jury was the 
first question; whether the Defendant was negligent. Since this 
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was answered in the negative by the jury, the remaining questions, 
including the questions pertaining to Dr. Dobson care, were not 
addressed. (R. at 613-617; 692-693). 
15. Following the jury verdict, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
New Trial with supporting Memorandum. (R. at 644-652) . 
16. The sole basis for Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial was 
the assertion that the Division of Licensing's investigative report 
should have been admitted as evidence of habit or practice, 
pursuant to Rule 4 06, URE, and that the trial court erred by 
excluding such evidence. No issue was raised with regard to the 
special verdict form. (R. at 646-652). 
17. On or about December 6, 1996, the trial court denied 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, finding, as it did at trial, that 
the prejudicial nature of the report of the Division of Licensing 
and the observations of Defendant's former dental assistant 
outweighed the probative value of the evidence. (R. at 682-687). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiffs' brief fails to provide a single citation to 
the record in the Statement of the Case, the Statement of Facts, or 
the Summary of Argument. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure requires that an appellate brief contain a statement of 
7 
the facts of the case "supported by citations to the record." This 
Court, and the Utah Supreme Court, have held that where an 
appellant fails to make a concise statement of the facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported 
the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987); Phillips v. 
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Koulis v. 
Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987)). Due to 
Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 24 in this instance, their 
brief should be disregarded. 
2. The general rule in Utah is that issues which are not 
raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In 
this instance, Plaintiffs' brief challenges the constitutionality 
of Section 78-27-38, U.C.A. No such challenge was raised at any 
time, however, before the trial court. Thus, Plaintiffs' failure 
to raise their constitutional objection before the trial court 
precludes them from raising it on appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 
challenge to Section 78-27-38 should not be addressed on the 
merits. 
3. Plaintiffs assert on appeal that they suffered injury 
resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional apportionment of 
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fault to a nonparty, Dr. Dobson, even though the jury found no 
negligence and never reached the question of apportionment of 
fault. The Utah Supreme Court addressed this exact question in 
1994, holding that where the jury found no legal negligence, and 
therefore never reached the special verdict form, there was no 
prejudice to the plaintiff at trial and the error, if any, was 
harmless. Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1026 (Utah 1994). 
4. Plaintiffs' brief fails to set forth any citation to the 
record below which establishes that they objected to the inclusion 
of Dr. Dobson on the special verdict form. In the absence of a 
complete record, specifically of evidence that this issue was 
preserved below, it is assumed that the proceedings in the trial 
court were regular and proper. Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 
1024-1025 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' failure to estab-
lish that an objection to the special verdict form was raised and 
preserved in the trial court requires that the decision below be 
affirmed. 
5. Based on the holdings referred to above in Koulis v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California. 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987), 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996) and Turner v. Nelson, 
872 P. 2d 1021 (Utah 1994), Defendant asserts this issue should not 
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be addressed on the merits. In the event it is addressed on the 
merits, Plaintiffs fail to set forth any authority or persuasive 
argument which overcomes the presumption of constitutionality that 
is granted to legislative enactments in Utah. The decisions of 
this Court and the Utah Supreme Court pertaining to apportionment 
of fault under the Utah Comparative Fault statutes establish that 
the inclusion of a nonparty on a verdict form is not a consti-
tutional violation. National Service Industries, Inc. v. B.W. 
Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc., 937 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1997); 
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993) . 
6. Plaintiffs' brief sets forth three separate arguments 
which challenge the trial court's ruling regarding the admissi-
bility of evidence and the application of Rule 403 to the evidence. 
Plaintiffs initially assert that the trial court was mandated by 
Rule 609, URE, to admit into evidence the report of the Division of 
Licensing pertaining to its investigation into Dr. Day's dental 
practice. 
Rule 609 pertains to evidence of the "conviction of a crime." 
The Division of Licensing is a State Administrative Agency which 
has no authority to convict individuals of crimes or impose any 
criminal punishment whatsoever. Accordingly, none of the findings 
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or conclusions reached by the Division as a result of its 
investigation of Dr. Day fall within the provisions of Rule 609. 
Further, Plaintiffs' argument that the report should have been 
admitted pursuant to Rule 609 also fails because they cite nothing 
in the record indicating that this issue was raised before the 
trial court. 
Plaintiffs' second argument pertaining to the trial court's 
Rule 403 decision is that error was committed because the trial 
court excluded the testimony of a former dental assistant of 
Defendant. Plaintiffs' brief sets forth no authority or rationale 
for their position that the trial court erred other than their 
unsupported belief that the information should have been admitted. 
As noted, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine prior to trial to 
exclude the testimony of Defendant's former dental assistant. 
Defendant's Motion was based on the grounds that the proffered 
testimony was not relevant, was not evidence of habit under Rule 
406, and pursuant to Rule 403, was inadmissable because of its 
propensity to mislead, confuse and create an undue prejudice 
exceeding the probative value of such evidence. Of particular 
importance was the fact that the evidence Plaintiffs sought to 
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admit concerned matters which occurred subsequent to the time of 
Decedent's alleged injury. 
The Court heard Defendant's Motion in Limine before trial 
commenced, but deferred ruling until well into the trial, after 
reviewing the proffered evidence and after hearing all of 
Plaintiffs' arguments. The Court, after careful consideration and 
thorough arguments outside the presence of the jury, expressly 
found that the probative value of the proffered evidence was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues or misleading the jury. Accordingly, the Court 
properly exercised its discretion under Rule 4 03 and excluded the 
evidence. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' assertion that the trial court did not 
use the proper analysis when evaluating the Rule 4 03 issue is 
without merit. The transcript from the proceedings clearly estab-
lishes that the trial court undertook the proper analysis when 
evaluating appellants' attempts to interject evidence pertaining to 
the Division of Licensing investigation. Further, similar argu-
ments have been rejected by this Court, holding that whether the 
trial court employs the precise language of Rule 4 03 is not 
dispositive of whether the ruling will be affirmed on appeal. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24, 
URAP, BY FAILING TO CITE TO THE TRIAL COURT 
RECORD. ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIAL COURTS DECI-
SION IS ASSUMED TO BE CORRECT AND PLAINTIFFS' 
APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED. 
Rule 24(a) (7) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires that an appellate brief contain a statement of the facts 
of the case "supported by citations to the record." In that 
regard, this Court has held that failure to comply with Rule 24 by 
not citing to the record will result in the brief being disregarded 
and the action of the trial court being affirmed. In Koulis v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 
1987) , this Court held that where an appellant "fails to make a 
concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the 
record where those facts are supported the court will assume the 
correctness of the judgment below. Id. (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). In reaching its decision in Koulis the Court reviewed 
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 24 of the appellate rules, 
finding it particularly instructive as to the intent of the rule: 
Inadequate appellate briefs, which do not signifi-
cantly assist the court in disposing of the case 
before it, have proved to be a significant problem. 
In order to alleviate this concern, this rule 
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clearly specifies the required contents and order of 
each brief . . . 
Paragraph (a)(7). This paragraph requires all 
statements of proceedings and facts to be supported 
by references to the record. The prior rule 
contained a similar requirement, but was frequently 
disregarded in practice. This rule is intended to 
emphasize that such citations are required in all 
cases, (emphasis added). 
Id-
Further, Rule 24 (j), URAP, provides that briefs which are not 
in compliance with these minimum standards of adequacy may be 
disregarded. In interpreting the rule, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held xx [I] f counsel on appeal does not provide adequate citations to 
the record, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be 
correct." Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987). 
In a more recent case, this Court reiterated that it will "assume 
the correctness of the judgment below if the appellant fails to 
make a 'concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in 
the record where those facts are supported.'" Phillips v. Hatfield, 
904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Koulis v. Standard Oil 
Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987)). 
In this instance, Plaintiffs' brief does not provide a single 
citation to the record in the Statement of the Case, the Statement 
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of Facts, or the Summary of Argument. Based on the above 
authority, and due to Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 24, 
Plaintiffs' brief must be disregarded. Accordingly, this Court 
should assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO RAISE THEIR CONSTITU-
TIONAL CHALLENGE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND 
ARE THEREFORE BARRED FROM RAISING IT ON 
APPEAL. 
The general rule in Utah is that issues not raised in the 
trial court cannot be raised on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 
5, 7 (Utah App. 1996) . In this instance, Plaintiffs' brief 
challenges the constitutionality of Section 78-27-38, U.C.A., which 
allows the fact finder to allocate fault to a non-party. No such 
challenge was raised at any time before the trial court. 
Plaintiffs' failure to raise their constitutional objection before 
the trial court precludes them from raising it on appeal. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs7 challenge to Section 78-27-38 should not 
be addressed on the merits but should be dismissed. 
Defendant acknowledges there are three exceptions to the above 
general rule which have been recognized in Utah (although Plain-
tiffs' brief makes no attempt to assert that any are present in 
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this instance). First, an appellate court may address an issue not 
raised below if the appellant establishes that the trial court 
committed plain error. Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208-09 (Utah 1993)). Second, an appellate court may address a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on appeal which 
was not raised below because of the claimed ineffectiveness. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7 (citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 
1029 (Utah 1991)). Third, an appellate court may address an issue 
not raised below if the court finds "exceptional circumstances." 
Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7 (citing State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 
(Utah App. 1991)). 
Plaintiffs' brief makes no argument for an exception to the 
rule, indeed does not even mention that a constitutional challenge 
cannot normally be raised for the first time on appeal. Of the 
three possible exceptions, two may be summarily disposed of. There 
is no argument for ineffective assistance of counsel when 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute, and the argument 
here is not one of plain error in interpretation or application, 
rather that the statute itself is unconstitutional. Therefore, the 
only possible basis upon which an exception to the general rule 
could rest is that of exceptional circumstances. Reiterating that 
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appellant made no argument that exceptional circumstances exist in 
this case, appellee nevertheless addresses the issue in the 
interest of a thorough reply. 
The exceptional circumstances doctrine has no precise defi-
nition. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8 (concept of exceptional circumstances 
"is an elusive one"); see also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209, n.3 (the 
exceptional circumstances exception is xxill-def ined") . The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized "authority for raising a 
constitutional issue for the first time on appeal" where the 
appellant's liberty is at stake. In re Woodward, 384 P. 2d 110, 
111-12 (Utah 1963) . In that case, appellant argued that a Utah 
statute granting control over the juvenile courts and judges to the 
executive branch was an unconstitutional violation of separation of 
powers. Id. at 113. Although the Court did not find a liberty 
interest implicated, it chose to reach the merits of the consti-
tutional challenge because there was no adversary process in 
juvenile proceedings at that time. Id. at 111-112, n.2. 
The concept of exceptional circumstances has consistently been 
discussed in the context of deprivation of personal liberty in 
criminal cases. See e.g. State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 802-03 
(Utah 1990) (defendant permitted to raise an issue of double 
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jeopardy on appeal because his personal liberty was at stake). 
However, this Court has underscored the extraordinary nature of 
this exception in expressly rejecting even the implication of a 
liberty interest as a "self-standing exception to the general rule" 
against raising constitutional issues for the first time on appeal, 
or as an exceptional circumstance per se. Irwin. 924 P. 2d at 9 
(citing State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 1991); 
see also State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) (expressly 
approving the Archambeau analysis). 
This Court has explicitly held that the doctrine should only 
be used for "truly exceptional situations," those in which there 
are "rare procedural anomalies." Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993)). 
In 1995, Utah's murder statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(1) (c) (1995) was challenged as being in violation of the United 
States and Utah Constitutions. State v. Blubaugh, 904 P. 2d 688, 
700 (Utah App. 1995) . The defendant did not challenge the con-
stitutionality of the statute at trial, but attempted to raise the 
issue for the first time on appeal. Id. The court held that it 
need not reach the claim because there was no argument of plain 
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. Id. at 701. Thus, 
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even in a criminal case where the deprivation of personal liberty 
occurred under the murder statute, the court has insisted on an 
affirmative showing of exceptional circumstances. 
Plaintiffs' failure to raise a constitutional objection in a 
civil trial does not rise to the level of rare procedural anomaly 
established as the standard for exceptional circumstances in Utah. 
Thus, assuming Plaintiffs had even attempted to assert there were 
circumstances which would allow them to raise an issue for the 
first time on appeal, the facts do not support a deviation from the 
general rule that you cannot raise a constitutional challenge for 
the first time on appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' constitutional 
challenge should not be addressed on the merits but should be 
dismissed. 
POINT III 
EXISTING PRECEDENT IN UTAH ESTABLISHES THAT A 
CHALLENGE TO THE ADDITION OF A NONPARTY ON THE 
VERDICT FORM WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL 
WHEN A JURY FINDS NO FAULT ON THE PART OF THE 
DEFENDANT AND NEVER APPORTIONS ANY FAULT. 
Plaintiffs assert on appeal that they suffered injury 
resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional apportionment of 
fault to a nonparty, Dr. Dobson, even though the jury found no 
negligence and never reached the question of apportionment of 
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fault. The Utah Supreme Court addressed this exact question in 
1994, however, holding that where the jury found no legal 
negligence, and therefore never reached the special verdict form, 
there was no prejudice to the plaintiff at trial. Turner v. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1026 (Utah 1994). In Turner, the plaintiff 
argued on appeal that the intent of the Utah Liability Reform Act 
and the statutory scheme was that the non-party be added as a party 
before being included on the special verdict form. Id. The jury, 
however, determined that the defendant was not negligent and 
therefore never reached the issue of apportionment. Id. The Court 
found, in relevant part: 
The jury determined that Nelson was not negligent. 
For that reason, the jury never reached the issue of 
whether Turner herself or Salt Lake City was negli-
gent, and the jury never apportioned fault between 
the parties. Turner simply has not provided this 
court with a cogent theory of how Salt Lake City's 
inclusion on a portion of the special verdict form 
that the jury never reached altered the facts, the 
presentation of those facts, or the result in this 
case. 
The jury determined that Nelson was not legally 
negligent. Turner has failed to demonstrate how the 
City's presence on a portion of the special verdict 
form that was not completed by the jury prejudiced 
her case. The error, if any, was harmless. We 
affirm the trial court. 
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The facts in this instance are essentially identical. 
Plaintiffs assert prejudice by the inclusion of Dr. Dobson on the 
special verdict form, yet the jury found Defendant not negligent, 
and never reached apportionment on the special verdict form. 
Accordingly, Turner is the controlling case precedent on this issue 
and dispositive of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Plaintiffs' brief not only fails to distinguish Turner but it 
makes absolutely no reference to the case, despite the fact that it 
is directly on point. As a consequence, no argument is set forth 
to explain why binding precedent from the Utah Supreme Court should 
not be followed. Therefore, the decision of the jury below must be 
affirmed and the question of the constitutionality of Section 78-
27-38 should not be reached. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO CITE TO THE RECORD 
TO ESTABLISH THAT THEY OBJECTED BELOW TO THE 
INCLUSION OF DR. DOBSON ON THE VERDICT FORM. 
Plaintiffs' brief fails to set forth any citation to the 
record below which establishes that they objected to the inclusion 
of Dr. Dobson on the verdict form. This Court, as well as the Utah 
Supreme Court, have noted that in the absence of a complete record, 
it is assumed that the proceedings in the trial court were regular 
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and proper. Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1024-1025 (Utah 
1994). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' failure to establish that an 
objection to the special verdict form was raised and preserved in 
the trial court requires that the decision below be affirmed. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF SECTION 78-27-38 IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
In light of the preceding arguments, Defendant believes that 
Plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of Section 78-27-38, 
U.C.A., should not be addressed by this Court. In the event the 
Court does address the merits of Plaintiffs' challenge, Defendant 
will briefly address why Plaintiffs' challenge is without merit. ^ 
As noted by this Court and the Supreme Court, principles of 
judicial restraint must govern state constitutional challenges. In 
assessing the constitutionality of legislative enactments in Utah, 
such as Section 78-27-38, Utah courts adhere to and apply several 
general principles. Initially, Utah courts recognize that a 
legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and every reason-
able doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Ryan v. 
Gold Cross Services, Inc.. 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995). More-
over, the presumption requires a court to presume that the 
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classification was intended to further the legislative purpose, 
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993). Finally, a statute 
should be held valid unless there is a clear, complete and unmis-
takable violation of that constitutional provision. Id. The 
constitutional challenge to Section 78-27-38 made in this instance 
should be evaluated in light of the above general principles. 
In 1986, the Utah Legislature passed the Liability Reform Act 
and abolished joint and several liability. As recently noted by 
this Court, one of the primary driving forces behind the passage of 
the Liability Reform Act was "basic fairness." National Service 
Industries, Inc. v. B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc., 937 
P.2d 551, 555 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs' challenge to Section 78-27-38 in this instance 
fails to set forth any authority to support their position, with 
the exception of one case from Montana. Utah's Comparative Fault 
statutes, however, are modeled after the Wisconsin statutes and the 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin has held that it is proper to include 
non-parties on the verdict form when apportioning fault. Martz v. 
Trecker. 535 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Wis. App. 1995). Further, the Utah 
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the need for 
including all tortfeasors, whether or not they are parties, when 
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attempting to apportion fault. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of 
Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 879-880, 882 (Utah 1993). As support for its 
analysis in Sullivan, the Court set forth an appendix of those 
cases from the Pacific Reporter which allowed the apportionment of 
nonparty fault in negligence actions. Id. at 884. 
Although no constitutional challenges were brought in the 
Sullivan or National Service Industries cases, the analysis set 
forth in the two cases regarding the Utah Comparative Fault 
statutes establish that the inclusion of a nonparty on a verdict 
form is not a constitutional violation. This is further supported 
by the Wisconsin court's decision in Martz and the decisions of the 
numerous jurisdictions set forth in the Appendix in Sullivan. 
Based on the above authority, and on the presumption of consti-
tutionality which is accorded legislative enactments in Utah, and 
on Plaintiffs' failure to set forth any basis to overcome that 
presumption, Plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of 
Section 78-27-38 is without merit and must fail. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE, EXCLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM INTRO-
DUCING INTO EVIDENCE THE REPORT OF THE 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
LICENSING AND THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S 
FORMER DENTAL ASSISTANT, WAS AN APPROPRIATE 
EXERCISE OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION. 
A. Standard of Review—Rule 403. 
Plaintiffs' brief sets forth three separate arguments which 
challenge the trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of 
evidence and the application of Rule 403 to the evidence. Due to 
the fact that any ruling issued by the trial court pertaining to 
Rule 403 will be reviewed under the same standard, Defendant will 
briefly set forth the standard applied by Utah appellate courts 
when faced with challenges to a trial court's application of Rule 
403. 
Rule 403 provides " [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. 
A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under 
Rule 4 03 will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of 
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discretion. State v. Troyer. 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1995). In 
fact, the Utah Supreme Court held in Troyer that it would not 
overturn a trial court's finding that the evidence was inadmissable 
under Rule 403 unless it was "beyond the limits of reasonability." 
Id. (quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993) 
(emphasis added). The rationale for according such deference to 
the trial court is because it is in a better position to assess and 
evaluate the evidence in the context of the trial. Further, this 
Court has noted that the trial court has "considerable freedom in 
applying [Rule 403] to the facts, freedom to make decisions which 
appellate judges might not make themselves ab initio but will not 
reverse." State v. Blubauah, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), 
cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 937-938 (Utah 1994). 
The question in this instance, therefore, is whether the trial 
court's decision to exclude evidence pertaining to the inves-
tigation conducted by the Division of Licensing was "beyond the 
limits of reasonability." 
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B. Plaintiff s/ Assertion That Rule 609 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence Requires the Admission of a 
Report from the Division of Licensing Is Incorrect 
and Without Merit. 
Plaintiffs' assert that the trial court was mandated by Rule 
609, URE, to admit into evidence the report of the Division of 
Licensing pertaining to its investigation. Plaintiffs' argument is 
entirely without merit and, in light of the pleadings submitted by 
Plaintiffs to the trial court on this issue, appears to be 
insincere. 
Rule 609 pertains to evidence of the "conviction of a crime." 
The Division of Licensing is a State Administrative Agency which, 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 58-1-103, was created to administer and 
enforce all licensing laws. The Division has no authority to 
convict individuals of crimes or impose any criminal punishment 
whatsoever. Accordingly, none of the findings or conclusions 
reached by the Division as a result of its investigation of Dr. Day 
fall within the provisions of Rule 609.1 
Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine seeking to 
exclude all evidence of prior convictions and of the investigation 
ironically, given Plaintiffs' argument, the trial court did 
admit into evidence over the objection of Defendant's counsel the 
fact that Defendant had been convicted of fraud in the District 
Court. 
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conducted by the Division of Licensing. (R. at 339-347). 
Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
in Limine, (R. at 349-357) . Plaintiffs' memorandum argued, in 
separate points, that (1) Defendant's prior fraud convictions were 
admissible pursuant to Rule 609, URE, and, (2) the materials 
resulting from the Division of Licensing investigation were 
admissible pursuant to Rule 4 06, URE, as evidence of habit. (R. at 
350-355) . Accordingly, plaintiffs recognized at that time the 
distinction between a criminal conviction and a licensing inves-
tigation. As noted in footnote 1, Plaintiffs were successful in 
admitting Defendant's criminal convictions for fraud. The trial 
court's ruling on the report from the Division of Licensing, 
however, was that its probative value was outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice. 
In addition to the fact that the Division of Licensing's 
report is not evidence of the conviction of a crime, Plaintiffs' 
argument that the report should have been admitted pursuant to Rule 
609 also fails because they cite nothing in the record indicating 
that this issue was raised before the trial court. Since this 
issue was not raised below, it cannot be raised on appeal. State 
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
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As noted, Plaintiffs' argument before the trial court was that 
the report was admissible as evidence of habit pursuant to Rule 
406. This was also their argument in their Motion for New Trial. 
(R. at 644-652). As is clear from the trial court's rulings on the 
Motion in Limine and Motion for New Trial, the trial court was 
never asked to address the claim now asserted on appeal that the 
report was admissible pursuant to Rule 609. (R. at 682-687). 
Accordingly, assuming for argument purposes that there was any 
merit to this argument, Plaintiffs are prohibited from raising this 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' assertion that they sought to use such 
evidence for impeachment but were denied is inconsistent with the 
trial court's discussion on this issue. In fact, the court 
specifically stated that it would allow its use for impeachment 
under the proper circumstances. (R. at 769-770). No such circum-
stances arose, however, and the issue of whether previously 
excluded evidence could be used for impeachment was never raised. 
C. The Trial Court's Exclusion of Testimony Regarding 
Alleged Observations By a Former Dental Assistant 
Was an Appropriate Exercise of Discretion. 
Plaintiffs' second argument under the rubric of the trial 
court's Rule 403 ruling is that plain error was committed because 
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the trial court excluded the testimony of a former dental assistant 
of Defendant. Plaintiffs' two-page argument on this point sets 
forth no authority to support their position. Further, Plaintiffs 
incorrectly characterize the report of the Division of Licensing as 
resulting in a conviction for fraud. (See Plaintiffs' Brief at 
33.) As discussed in more detail above, the Division of Licensing 
does not have the authority to enter criminal convictions. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' brief sets forth no rationale for their 
position that the trial court erred other than their unsupported 
belief that the information should have been admitted. 
As noted, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine prior to trial to 
exclude the testimony of Defendant's former dental assistant. 
Defendant's Motion was based on the grounds that the proffered 
testimony was not relevant, was not evidence of habit under Rule 
406, and pursuant to Rule 403, was inadmissable because of its 
propensity to mislead, confuse and create an undue prejudice 
exceeding the probative value of such evidence. (R. at 339-347). 
Of particular importance was the fact that the evidence Plaintiffs 
sought to admit concerned events which allegedly occurred subse-
quent to the time of Decedent's treatment. 
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Furthermore, Defendant argued that evidence pertaining to the 
investigation by the Division of Licensing would severely prejudice 
him in presenting his defense. (R. at 343) . The jury would be 
inclined to find on behalf of the Plaintiffs, not based on the 
evidence in this case with respect to the Decedent, but based on 
extraneous allegations and circumstances unrelated to the merits of 
the present action. Furthermore, the jury could become confused 
about whether they were judging Dr. Day's conduct with respect to 
the instant case or simply judging Dr. Day in general. Finally, 
Defendant argued that allowing Plaintiffs to introduce such 
extraneous evidence would result in a trial about Defendant's 
conduct with respect to people who were not plaintiffs in the 
instant action; and not about whether Plaintiffs were entitled to 
recover based on the care and treatment rendered to the Decedent. 
(R. at 343) . 
Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's Motion argued that the 
evidence was admissible pursuant to Rule 406 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which provides: "Evidence of the habit of a person or of 
the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or 
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to 
prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a 
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particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine 
practice." (R. at 349-357). The evidence which Plaintiffs sought 
to admit, however, was evidence of behaviors which relate to a 
period of time approximately a year after the alleged injury to the 
Decedent. Plaintiffs' Memorandum offered no authority to support 
the use of Rule 406 as a basis for admitting evidence of a custom 
or practice which post-dates the matter in question. 
The Court heard Defendant's Motion in Limine before trial 
commenced, but deferred ruling until well into the trial, after 
reviewing the proffered evidence and after hearing all of 
Plaintiffs' arguments. Much of the proffered evidence would have 
been inadmissible for lack of foundation, based on relevance, and 
based on hearsay. Additionally, the proffered evidence, even if 
otherwise admissible, did not establish a "habit" or "routine 
practice" as required for admissibility under Rule 406. Regardless 
of admissibility or lack of admissibility based on other grounds, 
however, the Court, after careful consideration and thorough 
arguments outside the presence of the jury, expressly found that 
the probative value of the proffered evidence was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues 
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or misleading the jury. Accordingly, based on Rule 4 03 the 
evidence was excluded. 
Based on the evidence before the trial court, its decision to 
exclude the testimony of Defendant's former dental assistant was in 
no way "beyond the limits of reasonability." A portion of the 
trial court's rationale for excluding the testimony is set forth in 
the partial transcript that is part of the record on this appeal: 
I'm not going to allow you to refer to Deanna 
Bailey's notes. I'm not going to allow you to refer to 
the proposed exhibits that were provided to me—I believe 
they were yesterday—for the same reasons. I don't find 
they go to the issue of truthfulness under 608(b) that 
you are entitled to cross-examine on. I think they go to 
specific bad acts, evidence of other bad acts, other 
conduct of the witness which the rule is designed to 
exclude, and 403 is available for the court to consider 
in the weighing process. 
I'm trying to keep the evidence in this case on the 
care and treatment or lack thereof as it relates to Randy 
Wilson, and not other patients, not other cases, and keep 
the trial focused in that area, Mr. Young. 
(R. at 765) . 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' challenge to 
the trial court's decision must fail and the jury's decision should 
be affirmed. 
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D. The Trial Court Applied the Proper Rule 403 
Analysis to This Matter. 
Plaintiffs apparently argue that the trial court was required 
to use certain language when issuing its Rule 4 03 ruling on the 
Division of Licensing report; and the lack of such terminology 
implies that the court's analysis was flawed and an abuse of dis-
cretion. This very same argument, however, was recently rejected 
by this court in State v. Alonzo-Nolasco. 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 
1997). In Alonzo-Nolasco, this Court held that whether the trial 
court employs the precise language of Rule 4 03 is not dispositive 
of whether the ruling will be affirmed on appeal: 
Although the trial court did not provide any specific 
findings regarding his exclusion of the evidence under 
Rule 403, beyond asserting that the prejudice outweighed 
the probative value, "we will 'affirm if we can find some 
basis in the record for concluding that the trial court's 
action falls within the limits of permissible discretion 
under Rule 403.'" State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 
1988)(citation omitted). Further, we can find the trial 
court properly applied Rule 403 in making its decision 
even though the trial court did not use the exact 
language of Rule 403. See State v. Troyer, 910 P. 2d 
1182, 1191 (Utah 1995) (finding trial court employed Rule 
4 03 in making its decision even though it did not 
specifically term its analysis xxa Rule 403 analysis"); 
see also Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 
P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah 1995) (stating exact language or 
terminology is not conducive as to whether trial court 
employed correct analysis). 
Id. at 613-614. 
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In this instance, the transcript of the trial court's decision 
clearly establishes that it undertook the proper analysis when 
evaluating appellants' attempts to interject evidence pertaining to 
the Division of Licensing investigation: 
The objection is sustained. You are not to refer to the 
state licensing procedures, the actions of the state, or 
the specific cases that were used by the state to result 
in revocation of his license. I have already indicated—I 
think I did in chambers, even on the record, even under 
Rule 403—1 thought, and do find, that is unfairly 
prejudicial in this case. It's misleading to the jury. 
It would be confusing of the issues and would be trying 
other issues and other cases that would be unfair in this 
case. 
(R. at 764) . 
Given that Rule 4 03 provides "evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury," the 
above passage establishes that the trial court applied the proper 
Rule 4 03 analysis. Further evidence of the trial court's proper 
application of Rule 403 is set forth in its Memorandum Decision 
addressing Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, which notes that it 
concluded during trial that "the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
jury substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence." 
(R. at 686). 
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Based on the above, Plaintiffs' assertion that the trial court 
did not properly assess the evidence pursuant to Rule 403 is 
without merit. As noted, the record establishes the trial court 
gave considerable analysis to the proffered evidence prior to its 
exclusion. (686, 762-770). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, Defendant 
asserts Plaintiffs have failed to set forth grounds supporting 
reversal of the jury verdict entered in this matter in favor of 
Defendant. Accordingly, the jury's decision should be affirmed and 
Plaintiffs' Appeal must fail. 
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